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加拿大计算机专业作业:The use of Computer Algebraic Systems in Game The(2)

时间:2019-04-02 13:26来源:未知 作者:anne 点击:
In addition, Bournramsand Cournotbys demand effect is more intense: competition is not intense, the number of competition to increase the enterprise to more consumers to provide services. Therefore, C
In addition, Bournram'sand Cournotby's demand effect is more intense: competition is not intense, the number of competition to increase the enterprise to more consumers to provide services. Therefore, Company A has a greater motivation to find on the right. In addition, a * decreases with t. Intuition is as follows. On the one hand, the power of strategic effects increases; on the other hand, the higher the t, the higher the equilibrium price that consumers start buying from Company A after transferring to Company A. The second effect is less severe in Cournot than in Bertrand (Cournot's competition is less intense, so the new consumer's equilibrium markings are less sensitive to changes in transport cost parameters): In the Bournrand framework, the Cournot framework, Dominant: therefore, the equilibrium distance between the two firms increases with t.
It takes into account a spatial discriminatory one-way Hotelling model in which two firms can move in only one direction. It analyzes the equilibrium that occurs in two different two-stage games: In the game (Bertrand), it is assumed that the firm first selects the position and then sets the price list, where the price may vary from place to place. In another game (Cournot), I assume that the firm first selects the location and then sets the quantity plan, where the number may vary from location to location (Lu &Poddar, 2014).
I show that in both games, a company is located at the end of the market to maximize the number of consumers it monopolizes. However, the equilibrium position of the other firm varies in both models. In Bertrand, a company that is not located at the endpoint is located near the middle of the segment (aggregation never occurs). Conversely, in Cournot, when transportation costs are low, aggregation occurs, and when transport costs are high, a decentralized equilibrium occurs. Cournot has a lower equilibrium distance than Bertrand. Finally, contrary to BHM, I show that the Cournot competition may be superior to the Bertrand competition: when transportation costs are low enough.
References 
Gross, J., &Holahan, W. (2003). Credible Collusion in Spatially Separated Markets. International Economic Review, 44(1), 299-312.
Huang, T. (2009). Hotelling competition with demand on parallel line. Economics Letters, 102(3), 155-157.doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2008.12.009
Eaton, B., &Tweedle, J. (2012). A Hotelling style model of spatial competition for a convenience good. Annals Of Regional Science, 49(2), 447-469.doi:10.1007/s00168-011-0458-0
Biscaia, R., &Mota, I. (2013). Models of spatial competition: A critical review.Papers In Regional Science, 92(4), 851-871. doi:10.1111/j.1435-5957.2012.00441.x
Tabuchi, T. (2012). Multiproduct Firms in Hotelling's Spatial Competition. Journal Of Economics & Management Strategy, 21(2), 445-467.doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2012.00336.x
Lu, Y., &Poddar, S. (2014). Patent licensing in spatial models. Economic Modelling, 42250-256.doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2014.06.016
 


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