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留学作业网专业提供指导美国留学生社会心理学essay，指导美国assignment。Emotion Regulation in Adulthood: Timing Is Everything
Author(s): James J. Gross
Source: Current Directions in Psychological Science, Vol. 10, No. 6 (Dec., 2001), pp. 214-219
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Association for Psychological Science
Stable URL: Accessed: 27/12/2009 10:49
Abstract
Two recent theories withinevolutionary psychology haveproduced novel insights intoconflict between the sexes. According to error management the
ory (EMT), asymmetries overevolutionary time in the costbenefit consequences of specific
social inferences have produced predictable cognitive biases. Women, for example,appear to underinfer commitment in response to signals of
resource display. Men oftenoverinfer a woman's sexual desire when she merely smiles ator casually touches them. Theseinferential biases, according to
EMT, represent functional adaptations rather than markersof irrationality in information
processing. According to strategic interference theory, certain"negative emotions" functionto motivate action to reduceconflict produced by impediments to preferred social strategies. Emotions such as
jealousy and anger, rather thanreducing rationality, may embody inherited ancestral wisdom functional in dealing withinterference inflicted by otherindividuals. These evolutionbased theories have producednovel empirical discoveriesand challenge traditional theories anchored in the premisethat cognitive biases and negative emotions necessarily leadto irrationality.
留学作业网专业提供指导美国留学生社会心理学essay，指导美国assignment。Keywordsconflict; cognitive bias; negative
emotions; sex differences; sexuality; evolutionary psychology
In mating and sexuality morethan in any other domain, womenand men have confronted differentCopyright ? 2001 American Psychological Society
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214 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 6, DECEMBER 2001
pie unidimensional ratings of pleasure or pain. People can experience
pain from sadness, anger, fear, anddisappointment. No one would argue that these emotions should betreated as equivalent. Furthermore,
some decision outcomes simultaneously give rise to pleasure andpain. In those cases, people feel ambivalence. Finally, what about the
duration of emotional experiences?
When is regret a fleeting incident,and when does it last a lifetime? An
swers to these questions will deepensocial scientists' understanding ofemotions, and lead to better tools forguiding choice.
Recommended ReadingGilbert, D.T., & Wilson, T.D. (2000).Miswanting: Some problems in theforecasting of future affective states.
In J. Forgas (Ed.), Thinking and feeling: The role of affect in social cognition
(pp. 178-197). Cambridge, England:Cambridge University Press.
Kahneman, D., & Varey, C. (1991).Notes on the psychology of utility. In J. Elster & J. Roemer (Eds.),Interpersonal comparisons of well
being (pp. 127-163). New York:Cambridge University Press.Landman, J. (1993). Regret: The persistence of the possible. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.Acknowledgments?Support was provided by the National Science Foundation(SBR-94-09819 and SBR-96-15993). Wethank Philip Tetlock for comments on anearlier draft.
Notes
1. Address correspondence to Barbara A. Meilers, Department of Psychology, The Ohio State University,Columbus, OH 43210; e-mail:mellers.l@osu.edu; or send e-mail to A.Peter McGraw atmcgraw.27@osu.edu.
2. Pleasure can be derived from actsof virtue, the senses, or relief frompain. Similarly, displeasurecan arisefrom anaggressive impulse,a sense ofinjustice, or frustration from fallingshort of a goal. Thus, choices based onpleasure need not imply hedonism.
References
Bell, D.E. (1982). Regret in decision making underuncertainty. Operations Research, 30,961-981.Bell, D.E. (1985). Disappointment in decision making under uncertainty. Operations Research, 33,1-27.Gilbert, D.T., Pinel, E.C., Wilson, T.C., Blumberg,
S.J., & Wheatley, T.P. (1998). Immune neglect:A source of durability bias in affective fore
casting. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol#p#分页标题#e#
ogy, 75,617-638.Kahneman, D. (2000). Evaluation by moments:Past and future. In D. Kahneman & A. Tversky
(Eds.), Choices, values, and frames (pp. 693-708).New York: Cambridge University Press.
Loewenstein, G., & Schkade, D. (1999). Wouldn'tbe nice? Predicting future feelings. In D.
Kahneman, E. Diener, & N. Schwarz (Eds.),Well-being: The foundations ofhedonic psychol
ogy (pp. 85-108). New York: Russell SageFoundation.
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982). Regret theory:
An alternative of rational choice under uncertainty. Economic Journal, 92,805-824.Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1986). Disappoint
ment and dynamic consistency in choice under uncertainty. Review of Economic Studies,53, 271-282.Meilers, B.A. (2000). Choice and the relative pleasure of consequences. Psychological Bulletin.
Meilers, B.A., & McGraw, A.P. (2001). Predictingchoices from anticipated emotions. Unpublished
manuscript, Ohio State University, Columbus.Meilers, B.A., Schwartz, A., Ho, K., & Ritov, I.
(1997). Decision affect theory: Emotional reactions to the outcomes of risky options. Psycho
logical Science, 8,423-429.Meilers, B.A., Schwartz, A., & Ritov, I. (1999).
Emotion-based choice. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 128,332-345.
Savage, L.J. (1954). The foundations of statistics. New
York: Wiley.
Schkade, D.A., & Kahneman, D. (1998). Does liv
ing in California make people happy? Psycho
logical Science, 9,340-346.
Emotion Regulation in Adulthood:
Timing Is Everything
James J. Gross1
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, California
Abstract
Emotions seem to come andgo as they please. However, weactually hold considerable swayover our emotions: We influencewhich emotions we have andhow we experience and expressthese emotions. The processmodel of emotion regulation described here suggests that howwe
regulateour emotions matters. Regulatory strategies thatact early in the emotion-generative process should have quitedifferent outcomes thanstrategies that act later. This review focuses on two widely usedstrategies for down-regulatingemotion. The first, reappraisal,comes early in the emotion-generative process. It consists ofchanging how we think about asituation in order to decrease itsemotional impact. Thesecond,suppression, comes later in theemotion-generative process. Itinvolves inhibiting the outwardsigns of emotion. Theory and rejsearchsuggest that reappraisalis more effective than suppression. Reappraisal decreases theexperience and behavioral ex
pression of emotion, and has noimpact on memory. By contrast,suppression decreases behavioral expression, but fails to decrease the experience ofemotion, and actually impairsmemory. Suppression also increases physiological respond
ing in both the suppressors andtheir social partners.
Keywordsemotion; mood; regulationSome goon in asportscar ca
reens across your lane. You brakehard. You feel like yelling, throwPublished by Blackwell Publishers Inc.#p#分页标题#e#
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 215
ing something, or even rammingthat idiot. Do you? Probably not.Instead, you regulate youremotions, and do something else thatyou think is more appropriate. Psychological research on emotionregulation examines the strategies
we use to influence which emotions we have and how we experience and express these emotions.
This research grows out of two earlier traditions, the psychoanalytictradition and the stress and copingtradition (Gross, 1999b).2 In this review, I describe a process model ofemotion regulation that distinguishes two major kinds of emotion regulation. I illustrate each byfocusing on two common forms ofemotion down-regulation?reappraisal and suppression?anddemonstrate how these two regulation strategies differ in their affective, cognitive,and social consequences.
A PROCESS MODEL OF
EMOTION REGULATION
Emotion regulation includes allof the conscious and nonconsciousstrategies
we use to increase, maintain, or decrease one or more com
ponents of an emotional response
(Gross, 1999a). These componentsare the feelings, behaviors, andphysiological responses that makeup the emotion.
A moment's reflection suggeststhere are many ways to go aboutregulating emotions. How can wemake sense of the potentially limitless number of emotion-regulationstrategies? According to my process model of emotion regulation(Gross, 1998b), specific strategiescan be differentiated along thetimeline of the unfolding emotional response. That is, strategiesdiffer in when they have their primary impact on the emotion-generative process, as shown in Figure 1.
At the broadest level, we can distinguish between antecedent-focusedand response-focused emotionregulation strategies. Antecedent-focused strategies refer to thingswe do before response tendencieshave become fully activated and
have changed our behavior andphysiological responses. An exam
ple of antecedent-focused regulationis viewing an admissions interviewat a school you have applied to as anopportunity to see how much youlike the school, rather than a test ofyour worth. Response-focusedstrategies refer to things we doonce an emotion is already underway, after response tendencieshave been generated. An exampleof response-focused regulation iskeeping a poker face while holdinga great hand during an excitingcard game.Situations Aspects
SI
S2
Slz
SituationSelectionSituation
Modification
Attentional
Deployment
Antecedent-focused
Emotion Regulation
Meanings Responses
r ml
- m2
-* m3
Emotion
Response
Tendencies
Experiential
+
Behavioral
Physiological
Cognitive
Change
Response
Modulation
Reappraisal Suppression
Response-focused
Emotion Regulation
Fig. 1. A process model of emotion regulation. According to this model, emotion may be regulated
at five points in the emotion#p#分页标题#e#
generative process: (a) selection of the situation, (b) modification of the situation, (c) deployment of attention, (d) change of cogni
tions, and (e) modulation of experiential, behavioral, or
physiological responses. The first four of these processes are antecedent
focused, and the fifth is response-focused. The number of response options shown at each of these five points in the illustration is
arbitrary, and the heavy lines indicate the particular options selected in the example given in the text. Two specific emotion-regu
lation strategies?reappraisal and suppression?are the primary focus of this review (Gross, 1998b).
Copyright ? 2001 American Psychological Society
216 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 6, DECEMBER 2001
As shown in Figure 1, five more Ispecific emotion-regulation strategies can be located within thisbroad scheme. The first is situationselection, illustrated in Figure 1 bythe solid arrow pointing towardSituation 1 (SI) rather than Situation 2 (S2). For example, you maydecide to have dinner with a friendwho always makes you laugh thenight before a big exam (SI), ratherthan going to the last-minute studysession with other nervous students (S2).
Once selected, a situation maybe tailored so as to modify its emotional impact (e.g., Six, Sly, andSlz in Fig. 1). This constitutes situation modification. For example, atdinner, if your friend asks whether
you are ready for the exam, youcan make it clear that you wouldrather talk about something else.
Third, situations have differentaspects (e.g., al-a5 in Fig. 1), andattentional deployment is used to select which aspect of the situation
you focus on. An example is distracting yourself from a conversation that has taken an upsettingturn by counting ceiling tiles.
Once you have focused on a particular aspect of the situation, cognitive change refers to selectingwhich of the many possible meanings (e.g., ml-m3 in Fig. 1) you willattach to that aspect. For example,
if your upcoming test is mentionedduring the dinner conversation,
you might remind yourself that"it's only a test/' rather than seeingthe exam as a measure of yourvalue as a human being. The personal meaning you assign to the
situation is crucial because it determines which experiential, behavioral, and physiological responsetendencies will be generated.
Finally, response modulation refers to attempts to influence theseresponse tendencies once theyhave been elicited, illustrated in
Figure 1 by the solid arrow pointing toward decreasing expressivebehavior. In our example, response Imodulation might take the form ofhiding your embarrassment afterbombing the exam. It might alsotake the form of altering experiential or physiological components ofemotion.
CONTRASTING TWOFORMS OF EMOTIONREGULATION: REAPPRAISALAND SUPPRESSION
Antecedent-focused strategieschange the emotion trajectory veryearlyon.
By contrast, responsefocused strategies occur after response tendencies have alreadybeen generated. This difference intiming predicts rather differentconsequences for these two kindsof emotion regulation. To test thisidea, my colleagues and I have focused on two specific strategies usedto down-regulate emotion. One is reappraisal. As shown in Figure 1, thisis a type of cognitive change, andthus antecedent-focused. Reappraisal means that the individualreappraises or cognitively r??valu?tes a potentially emotion-elicitingsituation in terms that decrease itsemotional impact. The second#p#分页标题#e#
strategy we have focused on is suppression, a type of response modulation, and thus response-focused.Suppression means that an individual inhibits ongoing emotionexpressive behavior.3 In the following sections, I describe our findingsconcerning the affective, cognitive,and social consequences of reappraisal and suppression.
Affective Consequences ofEmotion Regulation
Reappraisal occurs early in theemotion-generative process and involves cognitively neutralizing a
potentially emotion-eliciting situation. Thus, reappraisal should decrease experiential, behavioral, andphysiological responding. By contrast, suppression occurs later andrequires active inhibition of theemotion-expressive behavior thatis generated as the emotion unfolds. Thus, suppression shouldnot change emotion experience atall, but should increase physiological activation as a result of the effort expended in inhibiting ongoing emotion-expressive behavior.
To test these predictions, weneeded to elicit emotion in the laboratory. Researchers have used avariety of methods, including mu
sic, obnoxious confederates, andfilms, to elicit emotion. Films havethe advantage of being readilystandardized, and of provokinghigh levels of emotion in an ethically acceptable way (Gross & Lev
enson, 1995). To examine the affective consequences of emotionregulation, we used a short filmthat showed a disgusting arm amputation (Gross, 1998a). In the re
appraisal condition, participantswere asked to think about the filmthey were seeing in such a way
(e.g., as if it were a medical teaching film) that they would not respond emotionally. In the suppression condition, participants were
asked to hide their emotional reactions to the film. In the naturalcondition, participants simplywatched the film.
As expected, suppression decreased disgust-expressive behavior, but also increased physiologicalactivation. For example, participantsin the suppression condition had
greater constriction of their bloodvessels than participants in the natural condition. Like suppression,
reappraisal decreased expressive behavior. Unlike suppression, how
ever, reappraisal had no observ
able physiological consequences.4
Another predicted difference was
that reappraisal decreased the ex
perience of disgust, whereas sup
pression did not.
Related studies have confirmed
and extended these findings. In
Published by Blackwell Publishers Inc.
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 217
creases in physiological activation
also have been found when partici
pants suppress amusement and
sadness (Gross & Levenson, 1993,
1997). Note that there are no such
increases in physiological activa
tion when people "suppress" dur
ing a neutral film. This shows that
the physiological impact of sup
pression grows out of pitting at
tempts to inhibit expression
against strong impulses to express.#p#分页标题#e#
Absent a stimulus that produces
emotional impulses, suppression has
no impact on physiological respond
ing. The finding that reappraisal
decreases emotional responding
has recently been replicated using
a behavioral measure (the magni
tude of a startle response to a loud
noise burst) as an index of emo
tional state (Jackson, Malmstadt,
Larson, & Davidson, 2000).
Cognitive Consequences of
Emotion Regulation
Suppression is a form of emo
tion regulation that requires self
monitoring and self-corrective ac
tion throughout an emotional
event. Such monitoring requires a
continual outlay of cognitive re
sources, reducing the resources
available for processing events so
that they can be remembered later.
Reappraisal, by contrast, is evoked
early
on in the emotion-generative
process. Therefore, this strategy
typically does not require contin
ual self-regulatory effort during an
emotional event. This would make
costly self-regulation unnecessary,
leaving memory intact.
We tested these predictions in
several interlocking studies (Rich
ards & Gross, 2000). In one study,
participants viewed slides under
one of three conditions: reap
praisal, suppression, or a "just
watch" control. Slides depicted in
jured men, and information con
cerning each man was provided
orally as each slide was presented.
Suppression led to worse perfor
mance on a memory test for infor
mation presented during slide
viewing. Reappraisal did not.
To see whether our laboratory
findings would generalize to ev
eryday life, we examined memory
and individual differences in emo
tion regulation, measured with the
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire
(Gross & John, 2001). Individuals
with high scores on the Suppres
sion scale of the questionnaire re
ported having worse memory than
individuals with low Suppression
scores. They also performed worse
on an objective memory test in
which participants were asked to
recall events they had listed in a
daily diary 1 week earlier. By con
trast, Reappraisal scores had no re
lationship to either self-reported or
objective memory. Together, these
findings suggest that whereas sup
pression is cognitively costly, reap
praisal is not.
Social Consequences of
Emotion Regulation
Emotions serve important social
functions. Thus, emotion regula
tion should have social conse
quences, and different regulation
strategies should have different
consequences. As postulated in my
model, reappraisal selectively al
ters the meaning of an emotion
eliciting situation. In emotionally
negative situations, reappraisal de#p#分页标题#e#
creases negative emotion-expressive
behavior, but does not decrease posi
tive behavior. Suppression, by con
trast, decreases both negative and
positive emotion-expressive behav
ior. This decrease in positive emo
tion-expressive behavior should in
terfere with social interaction,
leading to negative reactions in
other individuals.
To test this prediction, we asked
unacquainted pairs of women to
view an upsetting film, and then dis
cuss their reactions (Butler, Egloff,
Wilhelm, Smith, & Gross, 2001). Un
beknownst to the other, one mem
ber of each dyad had been asked to
either suppress her emotions, reap
praise the meaning of the film, or
interact naturally with her conver
sation partner. We expected sup
pression to decrease both negative
and positive emotion-expressive
behavior in the regulator. Positive
emotion expressions are a key ele
ment of social support, and social
support decreases physiological re
sponses to Stressors (Uchino, Ca
cioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996). We
therefore reasoned that the dimin
ished positive emotion-expressive
behavior shown by participants
who suppressed their emotions
would produce large physiological
responses in their interaction part
ners. By contrast, we did not expect
participants given the reappraisal
instructions to show decreased
positive emotion-expressive be
havior. We therefore expected that
their interaction partners would
have physiological responses com
parable to those of the partners of
participants who acted naturally.
Figure 2 shows that partners of
participants asked to suppress
their emotions had greater in
creases in blood pressure than
partners of participants given reap
praisal instructions or asked to act
naturally. Interacting with a part
ner who shows little positive emo
tion is more physiologically acti
vating than interacting with a
partner who shows greater positive
emotion. This finding extends prior
work by Fredrickson and Levenson
(1998), who showed that positive
emotions speed cardiovascular re
covery from negative emotions.
Emotion-regulation strategies that
increase (or at least maintain) posi
tive emotion should be calming for
both the regulator and the interac
tion partner, whereas strategies
that diminish positive emotion
should increase physiological re
sponses of both the regulator and
the interaction partner.
Copyright ? 2001 American Psychological Society
218 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 6, DECEMBER 2001
35
30
S)25
Mu w o
&? 20
C?HO
15 15
S 10
Partner Partner Partner
Reappraises Natural Suppresses#p#分页标题#e#
Fig. 2. Social consequences of emotion regulation. Mean change in blood pressure is
shown separately for individuals whose conversation partners
were asked to reap
praise the situation, act naturally, or suppress their emotions (Butler, Egloff, Wil
helm, Smith, & Gross, 2001).
DIRECTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
My model suggests that adjust
ments made early in the emotion
trajectory are more effective than
adjustments made later on. The
findings I have reviewed support
this prediction. Reappraisal de
creases expressive behavior and
emotion experience, and does not
adversely affect physiological re
sponding, memory, or the regula
tor's interaction partner. Suppres
sion, by contrast, has no impact on
emotion experience, impairs mem
ory, and increases physiological re
sponding in both the regulator and
the partner.
One direction for future research
is to learn more about emotion regu
lation at each step in the emotion
generative process. This review has
focused on one type of cognitive
change and one type of response
modulation. Do other forms of cog
nitive change and response modula
tion have similar consequences?
Moreover, what are the differences
among the antecedent-focused strat
egies of situation selection, situation
modification, cognitive change, and
attentional deployment? Similarly,
what are the differences among the
response-focused strategies?
A second important direction for
future research is to explore the
long-term consequences of differing
emotion-regulation strategies. I
have largely focused here on the im
mediate effects of reappraisal and
suppression. However, if there are
consistent individual differences in
emotion and emotion regulation,
such differences might have cumu
lative effects. For example, each
time emotion is suppressed, physi
ological responses are magnified.
Any one physiological response of
increased intensity is unlikely to
have deleterious consequences. But
if such responses recur day after
day after day, there might be ad
verse health consequences. A recent
study illustrates how such a hy
pothesis might be tested. Heart at
tack survivors were divided into
four groups, depending on their
distress and their tendency to sup
press emotion (Denollet et al., 1996).
The subgroup scoring high on both
distress and suppression had a sig
nificantly higher death rate (27%)
than other patients (7%). This find
ing suggests that suppression in
deed has important cumulative
health consequences.
A third direction for future re
search is to explore whether people
regulate emotional impulses in the#p#分页标题#e#
same way as physical impulses
such as hunger, aggression, and
sexual arousal. Do strategies that
help people stay emotionally cool
also help them avoid eating that
extra piece of cake, or steer clear of
that tempting adulterous relation
ship? Or must each type of impulse
be handled differently? Answers to
such questions are of rich theoreti
cal interest, and will also have
great practical value for education
and therapy.
Recommended Reading
Gross, J.J. (1998a). (See References)
Gross, J.J. (1999a). (See References)
Richards, J.M., & Gross, J.J. (2000).
(See References)
Published by Blackwell Publishers Inc.
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 219
Acknowledgments?Preparation of this
article was supported by Grant MH53859
from the National Institute of Mental
Health. I would like to thank Jo-Anne Ba
chorowski, Lisa Feldman Barrett, Barb
Fredrickson, Oliver John, Ann Kring,
Sonja Lyubomirsky, Jane Richards, Steve
Sutton, and Jeanne Tsai for their helpful
comments.
Notes
1. Address correspondence
to
James J. Gross, Department of Psychol
ogy, Stanford University, Stanford,
CA 94305-2130; e-mail: james@psych.
stanford.edu; http://www-psych.
Stanford, edu/^psyphy/.
2. This review focuses on emotion
regulation
in adults. For a recent re
view of emotion regulation in child
hood, see Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie,
and Reiser (2000).
3. The term "reappraisal" has a
long history. Although some research
ers find it confusing because it suggests
that there is an initial appraisal that is
then reworked, I use it for historical
continuity. My focus here is on reap
praisal that is used to cognitively trans
form a
potentially negative-emotion
inducing situation so as to reduce its
emotional impact. The term "suppres
sion" also has a long history. It has I
been used to refer to inhibiting feel
ings, behavior, or thoughts. Here I use
it to refer to inhibiting emotion-expres
sive behavior.
4. One puzzle is why reappraisal
did not decrease physiological re
sponding in this study. The potency
and brevity of the surgical film may
have made it difficult for participants
to curtail their physiological responses
in the time specified.
References
Butler, E.A., Egloff, B., Wilhelm, F.H., Smith, N.C.,
& Gross, J.J. (2001). The social consequences of
emotion regulation. Manuscript submitted for
publication.
Denollet, J., Sys, S.U., Stroobant, N., Rombouts, H.,
Gillebert, T.C., & Brutsaert, D.L. (1996). Per
sonality as independent predictor of long-term#p#分页标题#e#
mortality in patients with coronary heart dis
ease. The Lancet, 347,417-421.
Eisenberg, N., Fabes, R.A., Guthrie, I.K., & Reiser,
M. (2000). Dispositional emotionality and reg
ulation: Their role in predicting quality of so
cial functioning. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 78,136-157.
Fredrickson, B.L., & Levenson, R.W. (1998). Posi
tive emotions speed recovery from the cardio
vascular sequelae of negative emotions.
Cognition & Emotion, 12,191-220.
Gross, J.J. (1998a). Antecedent- and response-fo
cused emotion regulation: Divergent conse
quences for experience, expression, and I
physiology. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 74,224-237.
Gross, J.J. (1998b). The emerging field of emotion
regulation: An integrative review. Review of
General Psychology, 2,271-299.
Gross, J.J. (1999a). Emotion and emotion regula
tion. In LA. Pervin & O.P. John (Eds.), Hand
book of personality: Theory and research (2nd ed.,
pp. 525-552). New York: Guilford.
Gross, J.J. (1999b). Emotion regulation: Past, pres
ent, future. Cognition & Emotion, 13,551-573.
Gross, J.J., & John, O.P. (2001). Individual differences
in emotion regulation processes: Consequences for
affect, well-being, and relationships. Manuscript
submitted for publication.
Gross, J.J., & Levenson, R.W. (1993). Emotional
suppression: Physiology, self-report, and ex
pressive behavior. Journal of Personality and So
cial Psychology, 64,970-986.
Gross, J.J.,& Levenson, R.W. (1995). Emotion elicita
tion using films. Cognition & Emotion, 9,87-108.
Gross, J.J., & Levenson, R.W. (1997). Hiding feel
ings: The acute effects of inhibiting positive
and negative emotions. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 106,95-103.
Jackson, D.C., Malmstadt, J.R., Larson, C.L., &
Davidson, R.J. (2000). Suppression and en
hancement of emotional responses to unpleas
ant pictures. Psychophysiology, 37,515-522.
Richards, J.M., & Gross, J.J. (2000). Emotion regu
lation and memory: The cognitive costs of
keeping one's cool. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 79,410-424.
Uchino, B.N., Cacioppo, J.T., & Kiecolt-Glaser, J.K.
(1996). The relationship between social sup
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Cognitive Biases and Emotional Wisdom
in the Evolution of Conflict Between
the Sexes
David M. Buss1Department of Psychology, University of Texas, Austin, Texas
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