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加拿大作业写作范文-金融危机对加拿大的影响。本文是一篇加拿大留学生作业写作范文，主要内容是讲述2008年9月最初的房地产泡沫演变成了美国几十年来最严重的经济衰退。虽然危机始于发达国家，主要是美国和欧洲国家，但世界各国都受到了银行倒闭和政府纾困等不利影响。尽管加拿大与美国有着密切的贸易伙伴关系，但欧洲是唯一一个没有银行倒闭或纾困的七国集团国家，面临着明显温和的衰退。自然，经济学家们开始对这种稳定的原因感兴趣，值得注意的因素是加拿大不可否认的保守态度和异常严格的监管。下面请参阅加拿大留学生作业写作范文。  Stability of Canadian Banking Sector in the Face of the Global Financial Crisis 面对全球金融危机，加拿大银行业的稳定性
In September 2008 what started out as a housing bubble transformed into the worst recession that the United States had seen in decades. Although the crisis started in the developed countries, primarily the US and European countries, all countries around the world suffered from its adverse effects featuring bank failures and government bailouts. Canada, although close trading partners with the US, and Europe was the only G7 country with no bank failures or bailouts and faced a significantly milder recession (Haltom, 2013). Naturally, economists became interested in the cause for this stability, notable factors being Canada’s undeniable conservative approach and exceptionally strict regulation.
Why were Canada’s banks stable in the face of the 2008 global financial crisis? This paper argues that the initial banking framework constructed in the early 19th century caused Canada’s banks to be stable. First, the resulting oligopoly allowed for easier regulation and implementation of restrictions by one overarching regulator. Second, Canadian banks, known to be less risky because of diversification allowed them to be less vulnerable to shocks. Lastly, with only 6 main competitors, there was low competition not leaving room for the shadow banking industry to thrive.
为什么加拿大的银行在2008年全球金融危机面前保持稳定？本文认为，19世纪初建立的初始银行框架使加拿大银行保持稳定。首先，由此产生的寡头垄断使得一个监管机构能够更容易地监管和实施限制。其次，由于多样化，加拿大银行的风险较低，因此它们不容易受到冲击。最后，由于只有6个主要竞争对手，竞争不激烈，影子银行业没有发展的空间。
This paper is organized as follows: by comparing Canada’s banking system with that of the USA we begin by highlighting the direction that the Canadian banking system took in the 19th and early 20th centuries. We then consider reasons why Canada demonstrated such resilience in the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Discussing this question will allow for other countries to learn and possibly implement the successful aspects of the Canadian financial system to better handle crises of this sort in the future.
本文的结构如下：通过比较加拿大和美国的银行体系，我们首先强调了19世纪和20世纪初加拿大银行体系的发展方向。然后，我们考虑加拿大在2007-2008年金融危机中表现出如此韧性的原因。讨论这个问题将使其他国家能够学习并可能实施加拿大金融体系的成功方面，以便在未来更好地处理此类危机。
Note that although, there exist trade-offs between stability and competition, defined as the “regulator’s dilemma,” the costs of stability won’t be identified nor will they be weighed against the benefits. This paper will focus primarily on the reasons that Canada remained stable in the face of the economic crisis in 2008.
请注意，尽管稳定与竞争之间存在权衡，被定义为“监管机构的困境”，但稳定的成本不会被确定，也不会与收益进行权衡。本文将主要关注加拿大在2008年经济危机面前保持稳定的原因。
The stability of the Canadian banking system in the 2008 global financial crisis is not a singular event. Throughout history, the banking system in the US faced at least eight major banking crises in the antebellum era, under the National Banking system and until the Federal Reserve System was established in 1913, unlike the Canadian banking system that experienced two minor incidences in the 1830s associated with problems in the US (Bordo et al., 2011).
在2008年全球金融危机中，加拿大银行体系的稳定性并不是一个单一事件。纵观历史，美国银行体系在战前时期，在国家银行体系下，直到1913年联邦储备体系建立之前，至少面临八次重大银行危机，而加拿大银行体系在19世纪30年代经历了两次与美国问题相关的小事件。
This difference originated because of the establishment appointed the jurisdiction over chartering and regulating banks. In Canada, the federal government and in the US, the state government. A dual banking system emerged during the civil war when the national banking system was established in addition to the state banking system already in place. The American banking system restricted nation-wide branch banking whereas the federal jurisdiction in Canada allowed branching across provincial and territorial borders. In the British North American Act that combined four colonies to create Canada in 1867, the federal government was given absolute authority to build the banking framework. The Canadian banking system evolved into an oligopoly that Bordo, Redish and Rockoff described as “a cartel backed by the federal government and policed by the Canadian Bankers Association” as the need for a charter limited entry into the industry.
Due to these initial institutional foundations, although Canada currently has 80 banks, 93 percent of the market share is dominated by only six with one financial regulator[1], Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) unlike the US that have managed to charter 7000 banks and multiple financial regulators (the Fed, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and state regulators) (Haltom, 2013). OSFI supervises every aspect of the financial institutions: mortgages, insurance, investments, etc.
Although branching is no longer prohibited in the US, this one restriction created a fragile and fragmented “unit banking[2]” in America as opposed to the highly concentrated and stable banking system in Canada in the face of the 2008 global financial crisis[3].
这种差异源于该机构指定了租赁和监管银行的管辖权。在加拿大，是联邦政府，在美国，是州政府。内战期间，除了已经建立的国家银行体系外，还建立了国家银行体系，从而形成了双重银行体系。美国银行系统限制全国分行业务，而加拿大联邦管辖区允许跨省和地区边界分行。1867年，《英国北美法案》将四个殖民地合并为加拿大，联邦政府被赋予建立银行框架的绝对权力。加拿大银行体系演变为寡头垄断，Bordo、Redish和Rockoff将其描述为“一个由联邦政府支持并由加拿大银行家协会监管的卡特尔”，因为需要特许有限进入该行业。
由于这些最初的体制基础，尽管加拿大目前有80家银行，但93%的市场份额由仅有六家银行和一家金融监管机构控制，金融机构监管局（OSFI）与美国不同，后者成功包租了7000家银行和多个金融监管机构（美联储、联邦存款保险公司、货币监理署和州监管机构）。OSFI监管金融机构的各个方面：抵押贷款、保险、投资等。
尽管分支机构在美国已不再被禁止，但这一限制在美国造成了一个脆弱和分散的“单位银行业务”，而在2008年全球金融危机面前，加拿大的银行体系高度集中和稳定。
It is well known that Canada enforces strict regulations and restrictions on their financial system. Capital requirements such as capital adequacy regulatory standards, permissible capital deductions and regulatory capital are amongst the most restrictive in the world (World Bank 2012). Canada has greater debt regulation such as restrictions on leveraging and reduced incognito leverage or off-balance sheet (OBS) items. In addition to strict regulations, every five years, Canada reviews charters and regulations to incorporate and adapt to innovation and unfamiliar risks that may be developing. What allows these regulations and changes in restrictions to be feasibly enforced and easily implemented is the highly concentrated structure of the banking system. This facilitated coordination is also beneficial during a time of financial crisis.
众所周知，加拿大对其金融体系实施严格的监管和限制。资本充足监管标准、允许资本扣除额和监管资本等资本要求是世界上限制最严格的资本要求之一。加拿大有更严格的债务监管，例如限制杠杆作用，减少隐名杠杆或资产负债表外（OBS）项目。除了严格的法规外，加拿大每五年审查一次章程和法规，以纳入和适应可能正在形成的创新和不熟悉的风险。银行体系高度集中的结构使这些法规和限制的变化得以切实执行并易于实施。在金融危机期间，这种促进协调的方式也很有益。
When discussing the 2008 global financial crisis, it’s important to note the role in lack of regulation and restrictions in causing it. The problems started with sub-prime[4] housing loans, which by 2006 were approximately 15 percent of pending mortgages in the US (Edey, 2009). There was a lack of regulation in identifying risk associated with administrating credit to borrowers with unreliable credit history and legitimate proof of income and lack of restrictions regarding loan-to-valuation ratio. The crisis continued to develop as the securitization of these sub-prime loans through mortgage-backed securities (MBSs)[5] and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs)[6] which are asset backed securities. These securities generated high returns and incorrectly received good credit[7] ratings by rating agencies attracting investors (Edey, 2009). The inevitable rise in mortgage delinquencies, reaching 11 percent at its peak, on these sub-prime mortgages that followed eliminated the confidence in these investments as the housing bubble burst. The first impact on the global financial markets was apparent when French banks suspended funds they were investing in US MBSs. Other European banks and OBS agents linked to them had also invested to a great degree in these securities making them prone to heavy losses (Edey, 2009).
在讨论2008年全球金融危机时，重要的是要注意到缺乏监管和限制在引发危机中的作用。这些问题始于次级住房贷款，到2006年，次级住房贷款约占美国待定抵押贷款的15%。对于向信用记录不可靠、收入证明合法、贷款与估值比率缺乏限制的借款人提供信贷管理相关风险的识别缺乏监管。随着这些次级贷款通过抵押支持证券（MBS）和债务抵押债券（CDO）进行证券化，危机继续发展。这些证券产生了高回报，并错误地获得了评级机构吸引投资者的良好信用评级。随着房地产泡沫的破灭，这些次级抵押贷款的抵押贷款拖欠率不可避免地上升，达到11%的峰值。当法国银行暂停投资美国MBS的基金时，对全球金融市场的第一个影响显而易见。与他们有联系的其他欧洲银行和OBS代理也在这些证券上进行了很大程度的投资，使其容易遭受重大损失。
In contrast, Canada’s mortgage financing regulations aren’t structured to allow for such careless lending. In Canada, banks keep mortgages rather than selling them to investors. Before the financial crisis, approximately 30 percent of Canada’s mortgages were securitized, much less than the US which stood at almost 70 percent (Halton, 2013). In addition, less than three percent were sub-prime mortgages, significantly reducing the risk that Canada was exposed to as tight regulation encouraged safe mortgages (Halton, 2013). Financial institutions are prohibited from giving loans without at least a five percent down payment. If the down payment is less than 20 percent, mortgages are required to have insurance. Strict restrictions for insurance are also in place as it is only approved if total household debt-to-income ratio is less than 40 percent. These restrictions kept mortgage default rates below the historical average of less than one percent in Canada (BLACK**). This highly concentrated banking system also provided incentive to banks to engage in less risky activities as a single failure would severely injure the financial system. Due to the small number of institutions in effect their engagement in less risky activities, OSFI successfully prevented the failures that sub-prime mortgages brought to the global market from entering Canada’s banks.
相比之下，加拿大的抵押贷款融资法规并没有考虑到这种粗心的贷款。在加拿大，银行持有抵押贷款，而不是将其出售给投资者。在金融危机之前，加拿大大约30%的抵押贷款证券化，远低于美国的70%。此外，不到3%的次级抵押贷款，大大降低了加拿大面临的风险，因为严格的监管鼓励安全抵押贷款）。金融机构被禁止在没有至少百分之五首付的情况下发放贷款。如果首期付款少于20%，抵押贷款必须有保险。对保险业也有严格的限制，因为只有当家庭总负债与收入的比率低于40%时，保险业才能获得批准。这些限制使抵押贷款违约率低于加拿大历史平均水平不到1%。这种高度集中的银行体系还鼓励银行从事风险较小的活动，因为单一的失败会严重损害金融体系。由于实际上参与风险较低活动的机构数量较少，OSFI成功地阻止了次贷进入全球市场的失败进入加拿大银行。
The unit banking system of the US resulted in small, fragile and undiversified banks. There was a chartered bank per city or region with no branches. Historically, these small banks held similar assets which were primarily local loans and mortgages. Leading up to the 2008 crisis, most banks were engaging in MBSs and CDOs investments attracted by the promise of high returns. According to the Bond Market Association of the $25.9 trillion bond market, mortgage debt contributed to $6.1 trillion (Lambert, 2006). Already less diversified than banks in Canada sub-prime lending added to this risk. Rating agencies gave CDOs high credit ratings on the basis that they were backed by mortgages that were regionally diversified. The CDOs were incorrectly rated as they consisted of primarily sub-prime mortgages, the regions in which these mortgages were issued made little or no difference to their risk.
美国的单位银行体系导致了小型、脆弱和单一的银行。每个城市或地区都有一家特许银行，没有分行。历史上，这些小银行持有类似的资产，主要是本地贷款和抵押贷款。在2008年危机爆发之前，大多数银行都在从事MBS和CDO投资，这些投资都是由高回报的承诺所吸引的。根据25.9万亿美元债券市场的债券市场协会，抵押贷款债务占6.1万亿美元。与加拿大银行相比，次级贷款的多样化程度已经较低，这增加了这种风险。评级机构给予CDO高信用评级的依据是，CDO由区域多样化的抵押贷款支持。CDO的评级不正确，因为它们主要由次级抵押贷款组成，这些抵押贷款的发行地区对其风险几乎没有影响。
The banks in Canada with nation-wide branching originally started off with geographically diversified assets, customers and risk constructed to be less risky which allows them to absorb shocks. With a small number of chartered banks, individual banks grew to be very large and in 1987 after the Bank Act was revised to increase competition, Canadian banks absorbed securities brokerages making them bigger than ever. This resulted in diverse sectors, investments as well as loans credited to customers. Canadian banks were now engaged in wealth management, insurance, mortgages lending, and securities brokerage (Pruss, 2015). Although attractive to smaller banks, the trade-off between higher return and high risk wasn’t one that Canadian banks needed to weigh. Only three percent of Canadian mortgages were sub-prime which further supports my argument that Canadian banks maintained diverse assets despite the pull of high return that CDOs and MBSs offered. The effects of this diversification were demonstrated historically with the small number of recessions and bank failures that Canada has faced in comparison with the US and in their ability to absorb shock in the 2008 financial crisis.
加拿大的银行最初在全国范围内设立分支机构，其资产、客户和风险在地理上分散，风险较小，因此可以吸收冲击。随着特许银行数量的减少，个体银行变得非常庞大。1987年，在修订《银行法》以增加竞争之后，加拿大银行吸收了证券经纪公司，使其规模比以往任何时候都大。这导致了不同的部门、投资以及贷记客户的贷款。加拿大银行目前从事财富管理、保险、抵押贷款和证券经纪业务。虽然对小型银行有吸引力，但加拿大银行不需要权衡高回报和高风险之间的权衡。只有3%的加拿大抵押贷款是次级抵押贷款，这进一步支持了我的观点，即尽管CDO和MBS提供了高回报，但加拿大银行仍保持着多样化的资产。与美国相比，加拿大面临的衰退和银行倒闭数量很少，而且它们在2008年金融危机中吸收冲击的能力也很强，这从历史上证明了这种多样化的影响。
The shadow banking activities, approximately 95 percent of the American economy played a large role in the global financial crisis (Haltom, 2013). Due to the highly concentrated nature of the Canadian banking system that fostered low competition and enforced tight regulation, the risky shadow banking industry didn’t have the same demand or freedom to grow the way it did in the US. The financial sector in the US consisted of two parallel banking systems, one that was regulated by multiple parties and another that transformed from investment banks and other financial intermediaries into the shadow banking industry, a market for activities restricted in the first (Bordo et al., 2011). Naturally, high risk activities gravitated towards the shadow banking industry which had vague restrictions and were mostly outside the regulatory umbrella (Haltom, 2013). This lack of regulation was followed by a lack of understanding in the risks associated with the industry as confidence levels were almost equal to that of the regulated sector. Krugmen (2009) claims that the problems associated with the crisis are less from deregulated institutions instead involve risks associated with “institutions that were never regulated in the first place.” As the shadow banking industry grew, the US moved towards the same financially vulnerable position that they experienced before the Great Depression. In addition, the Bush administration used their power and relation to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to eliminate any attempt to regulate sub-prime housing loans (Krugman, 2009).
影子银行活动约占美国经济的95%，在全球金融危机中扮演了重要角色。由于加拿大银行体系的高度集中性，助长了低竞争，并实施了严格的监管，因此高风险的影子银行业没有像美国那样的需求或自由增长。美国金融部门由两个平行的银行系统组成，一个由多方监管，另一个由投资银行和其他金融中介机构转变为影子银行行业，这是第一个限制活动的市场。自然，高风险活动被影子银行业所吸引，影子银行业有着模糊的限制，且大多不在监管范围之内。由于信心水平几乎等于受监管部门的信心水平，因此缺乏监管之后，对行业相关风险缺乏了解。克鲁格曼（Krugmen）声称，与危机相关的问题不是来自放松管制的机构，而是涉及与“最初从未受到监管的机构”相关的风险。随着影子银行业的发展，美国走向了大萧条前所经历的同样的金融脆弱境地。此外，布什政府利用其权力和与货币监理署的关系，消除任何监管次级住房贷款的企图。
In the decades leading up to the global financial crisis, the Canadian banking system diverged further from that of the US. Following the 1987 Bank Act revision, Canadian banks began engaging in securities brokerages, mortgages and other activities that in the US, unregulated institutions partake in. OSFI overtook the affairs of the Inspector General of Banks as well as the Superintendent of Insurance becoming the sole regulator of all federal financial institutions in Canada overseeing in addition to the bank, pension funds, insurance and trust companies. With increasing risk, Canada increased their regulation. Only approximately 40 percent of the Canadian economy includes shadow banking activities, a considerable fraction of which Canada’s banks have committed to. In addition, 60 percent of these are insured and have access to lender of last resort thus protected by the federal government. The competitive and unregulated environment that allowed the shadow banking industry to grow in the US didn’t exist in Canada.
在全球金融危机爆发前的几十年里，加拿大的银行体系与美国的银行体系进一步分化。1987年《银行法》修订后，加拿大银行开始从事证券经纪、抵押贷款和其他在美国未受监管机构参与的活动。OSFI接手了银行监察长和保险监督的事务，成为加拿大所有联邦金融机构的唯一监管机构，监管银行、养老基金、保险和信托公司。随着风险的增加，加拿大加大了监管力度。只有大约40%的加拿大经济包括影子银行活动，其中相当一部分是加拿大银行承诺的。此外，60%的影子银行都有保险，并且可以获得联邦政府保护的最后贷款人的帮助。加拿大并不存在允许影子银行业在美国发展的竞争和不受监管的环境。
Countries around the world were left crippled in the face of the 2008 global financial crisis, the most notable being the US where the crisis originated and developed. Canada was one exception as its banking system remained stable with no bank failures or government bailouts. Throughout history, in comparison to the US, Canada has suffered through less recessions, less panics and less bank failures. In the 2008 global financial crisis, Canada’s resilience is to be noted as it was a result of the nature the original banking framework created in the 19th century. Canada’s highly concentrated banking system allowed for tight regulation, diversification and low competition in the industry resulting in a less risky sector equipped to absorb the disastrous crisis of 2008. Although, Canada’s history has played a large part in constructing this stable system and any one solution or explanation for financial stability won’t miraculously save a nation, there is a great deal that other countries can learn from Canada to better equip themselves to handle crises in the future.
References 参考文献
Bordo, Michael D., Angela Redish, and Hugh Rockoff. “Why Didn’t Canada Have a Banking
Crisis in 2008 (Or In 1930, Or 1907, Or…)?” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 17312, August 2011.
Haltom, Renee. “Why was Canada Exempt from the Financial Crisis?” Econ Focus, Fourth Quarter, 2013, pp. 22-25.
World Bank. Crisis-proofing financial integration: Canada, June 2012, pp. 30-33. 1324485944855/03_canada.pdf
Edey, M. (2009), The Global Financial Crisis and Its Effects. Economic Papers: A journal of applied economics and policy, 28: pp. 186-195.
Krugman, Paul. The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 2009.
Lambert, G.D., 2006. Profit From Mortgage Debt With MBS. Investopedia.
Pruss, L., 2015. USA vs. Canadian Banking Systems. HQ Mortgages Inc.
这篇加拿大留学生作业总结：面对2008年的全球金融危机，世界各地的国家都陷入了困境，其中最引人注目的是危机发生和发展的美国。加拿大是一个例外，因为其银行体系保持稳定，没有银行倒闭或政府救助。纵观历史，与美国相比，加拿大经历的衰退更少，恐慌更少，银行倒闭更少。在2008年的全球金融危机中，加拿大的恢复力值得注意，因为这是19世纪最初银行框架所具有的性质的结果。作业提出加拿大高度集中的银行体系允许行业严格监管、多样化和低竞争，从而使风险较小的行业能够应对2008年的灾难性危机。尽管加拿大的历史在构建这一稳定体系中发挥了很大作用，任何一种金融稳定的解决方案或解释都不会奇迹般地拯救一个国家，其他国家可以向加拿大学习很多东西，以更好地装备自己，应对未来的危机。本站提供各国各专业留学生作业写作指导服务，如有需要可咨询本平台。
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